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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Finally, adoption of the French view would tranmute the seemingly
irreconcilable rules existing in North Carolina today into one practicable,





In the recent case Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co.,1 plaintiff em-
ployee was sent out on the road to change two flat tires on one of de-
fendant's trucks. After replacing the old tubes, it became necessary to
obtain air to inflate the tires, so plaintiff drove along the highway until
he found a service station open. He asked and received permission from
the man in charge to use the air hose. Before he inflated the first tire,
plaintiff was asked to assist in pushing off the stalled car of a customer
of the station. Plaintiff acceded to this request and, while pushing, was
struck and injured by an approaching car.
The North Carolina Industrial Commission awarded compensation
on the ground that there was an injury arising out of and in the course
of the employment.2 The supreme court affirmed the award, rejecting
the contentions that the plaintiff had deviated from the course of his
employment, and that the hazard was not peculiar to the employment.3
The main reasons given for the holding were that the response of the
plaintiff was natural and reasonable; that he had reasonable grounds
to believe that his acts were incidental to his employment and bene-
ficial to his employer; and that if the employer had been present he
would have instructed the employee to render the assistance. Under
the circumstances, the aid received from the service station and the aid
given by plaintiff were said to be so closely interwoven that the injury
"- For excellent discussions on the problem here presented, see: Johnson v.
Whelan, 186 Okla. 511, 98 P. 2d 1103 (1940), and Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39
Wyo. 494, 273 Pac. 908 (1929) with annotation in 97 A. L. R. 14 (1935).
1241 N. C. 448, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955).
- The term "arising out of" refers to the cause or origin of the accident, and
"in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the
accident occurred. Taylor v. Wake Forest, 228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947) ;
Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22 S. E. 2d 907 (1942) ; Ashley v. F-W
Chevrolet Co., 222 N. C. 25, 21 S. E. 2d 834 (1942). See also Note, 10 N. C. L.
REv. 373 (1932).
'If the risk involved is one to which all others in the general area are sub-
jected, as distinguished from a hazard peculiar to the employee's work, the re-
sulting injury is not compensable. Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co., 222 N. C. 724,
24 S. E. 2d 751 (1943); Plemmons v. White's Service, 213 N. C. 148, 195 S. E.
370 (1938). The court in the present case said, "Plaintiff, while pushing the
car onto and along the highway, subjected himself to a hazard not common to all
others in the neighborhood but peculiar to the task in which he was engaged."
Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 448, 454, 85 S. E. 2d 596, 601 (1955).
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must be held connected with4 and incidental to5 plaintiff's employment.
The court also distinguished the present case from the so-called "good
Samaritan" cases.6
There is a ground for an award of compensation in cases similar
to the present case which has been very little used or referred to by the
courts; that is, acts of employees which further the good will of the
employer.7 Good will is widely, if not universally, recognized as a very
valuable asset of any business.8 The acts of the employee creating good
will, such as picking up riders or doing other small favors for the
public in general, has a definite benefit to the employer's business.0 They
create a favorable attitude toward the business and aid in keeping its
name before the public. This is especially true when the business deals
directly with the customer, but it is also of benefit when it deals in-
directly, in view of the widespread policy of putting the organization's
name in conspicuous places on its cars and trucks.1 0
The employer's good will has been brought up in a few cases where
a third party sued the employer or master under the doctrine of re-
' As to the necessity for a causal connection between the employment and the
accident see, Taylor v. Wake Forest, 228 N. C. 346, 45 S. E. 2d 387 (1947).
As to the necessity that the acts of the employee be incidental to the em-
ployment see, Goodwin v. Bright, 202 N. C. 481, 163 S. E. 576 (1932).
' These cases involve situations where the employee voluntarily offers his assist-
ance to a third party solely as an act of humanity, the act. having no connection
to the employment or the employer's business. Sichterman v. Kent Storage Co.,
217 Mich. 364, 186 N. W. 498 (1922). See also, 17 Cm-KENT REv. 399 (1939),
commenting on Puttkammer v. Industrial Commission, 371 Ill. 497, 21 N. E. 2d
575 (1939) in which case compensation was granted.
'The appellee refers to good will at only one point: "The primary, if not
the sole object in the plaintiff's mind in so doing (pushing the car) was to ac-
complish his ultimate task for his employer with the good will and good relations
expected of him by his employer." Brief for Appellees, pp. 15-16, Guest v.
Brenner Iron & Metal Co., 241 N. C. 484, 85 S. E. 2d 596 (1955).
The court quotes from 7 SCHNEiDER, WORKmEN'S COMPENSATION § 1675
(1950): "However, where competent proof exists that the employee understood,
or had reasonable grounds to believe that the act resulting in injury . . . was
encouraged by the employer in performance of the act or similar acts for the
purpose of creating a feeling of good will, . . . " No other specific reference is
made to good will, but it is possible that the court may have had good will in
mind, although it was not used as a ground for the compensation award.
'Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 528 (1939), holding
that good will is as much "property" as is coal or pig iron, or wheat, and is sub-
ject to audit, taxation, appraisal, purchase, and sale.
' Examples are acts of telephone operators, bus or truck drivers, and train
conductors, in summoning aid, giving assistance to parties in need, and other
courtesies beyond the call of duty. In certain instances these acts may be of an
heroic nature. Employers are quick to take full advantage of such acts in their
advertisements to build up good will or better public relations for their organiza-
tions.
'0 Note, 17 CHI-KENT REV. 399 (1939) discusses the custom of placing the
business name on its vehicles, and the effect it has on the public when the driver
refuses a small favor. The argument that the plaintiff's act in the present case
v-s in furtherance of the defendant's good will would be stronger if a company




spondeat superior for injury caused by the employee's negligence.
Generally in these cases, the employee has picked up riders or is ac-
commodating friends, although they may not be potential customers of
the employer." The rider, friend, or some other person, e.g., a pe-
destrian, is injured by the negligence of the employee. The employer
contends that the employee has deviated from the scope of his employ-
ment, thereby relieving the employer of liability. 12 But if the acts can
be shown to have furthered the good will of the employer, the courts
may hold them to be within the scope -of the employment.' 3 This argu-
ment would seem to apply as well to workmen's compensation cases.
In both groups the main issue is whether the act in furtherance of good
will is a deviation' 4 to such an extent that it will relieve the employer
from responsibility or liability for the injury. The application would
not be too far-fetched in view of the fact that the courts tend to give
the compensation acts a very liberal construction.' 5 Under such a doc-
trine any bona fide argument in favor of the employee should be con-
sidered.
The workmen's compensation cases which have considered the em-
"' It should be noted that ordinarily one who is engaged to operate a motor
vehicle has no implied authority, by virtue of the employment, to invite or permit
third parties to ride; and the employer is ordinarily not liable for personal in-
juries sustained by the invitee while riding therein, except for willful or malicious
acts of the emplbyee. Wigginton Studio, Inc. v. Reuter's .Adm'r, 254 Ky. 128, 71
S. W. 2d 14 (1934); Cotton v. Carolina Truck Transportation Co., 197 N. C.
709, 150 S. E. 505 (1929). This rule does not apply where there is express or
ostensible authority to invite people to ride. Cole v. Johnson Motor Co., 217 N. C.
756, 9 S. E. 2d 425 (1940) ; Shrimplin v. Simmons Auto Co., 122 W. Va. 248,
9 S. E. 2d 49 (1940). The latter case left open the question whether a servant
in charge of an automobile may not in some circumstances be clothed with
ostensible or apparent authority.
"2 In Russell v. Cutshall, 223 N. C. 353, 26 S. E. 2d 866 (1943) it was alleged
that the employee had the implied authority to pick up passengers, on the ground
that the defendant customarily carried passengers in the conduct of business in
that particular area for the purpose of creating good will. The court held the
evidence did not sustain any such custom and the act was a deviation relieving the
employer of liability.
"3 Cole y. Johnson Motor Co., 217 N. C. 756, 9 S. E. 2d 425 (1940). In this
case there was a conflict in the testimony as to the authority of the employee to
pick up hitchikers; there was also evidence that in the course of the employee's
duties he was to promote good will by contacting prospects. The court held that
he was acting within the ostensible scope of his authority and whether the acts
constituted a violation of his instructions and thereby a deviation from the course
of the employment was a question for the jury. Cochran v. Michaels, 110 W. Va.
127, 133, 157 S. E. 173, 175 (1931). There the court said, "A friend picked up
became an eager informant as well as a partisan of the driver, and the interest of
the defendant was thus promoted." The Cochran case is criticized in Note, 37
W. VA. L. Q. 441 (1931), but is approved in Note, 18 VA. L. REv. 330 (1931).
1" Parrish v. Armour & Co., 200 N. C. 654, 158 S. E. 188 (1931) (Workmen's
Compensation) ; Paiewonsky v. Joffe, 101 N. J. L. 521, 129 Atl. 142 (1925)
(Master and Servant).
"2 Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38, 40, 153 S. E. 591, 593 (1930)
"It is generally held by courts that the various compensation acts of the Union
should be liberally construed to the end that benefits thereof should not be denied
upon technical, narrow, and strict interpretation."
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ployer's good will in granting an award have varied as to the authority
granted the employee. There are cases where express authority was
granted to do anything necessary to create good will. An example is
Gross v. Davey Tree Expert Co.10 where defendant company instructed
the employee to do all that he could to further the good will of the
telephone company for which defendant was working.' 7 Plaintiff's job
consisted of trimming trees that grew near the telephone lines. At the
request of a third party, plaintiff came down from a tree and pushed the
party's car approximately two miles in an attempt to get it started.
Plaintiff was injured at that point, distant from his place of employ-
ment. Compensation was granted on the ground that the defendant had
not placed any limit on the favors the plaintiff could extend.
At the other extreme are cases in which the furtherance of the em-
ployer's good will is implied from the nature of the employment itself
without any express authority. An example of this is Parrish v. Armour
& Co.' 8 where a wrong delivery was made to one of defendant's cus-
tomers and plaintiff was sent to straighten out the matter. On the way
to see the customer, plaintiff deviated several blocks to obtain some
cigars which he thought would be expedient to the purpose of his visit.
He was injured before he reached the place where he intended to obtain
the cigars. Compensation was granted by the commission on the theory
that the deviation was incidental to the employment.
It would also seem probable that acts furthering the good will of
the employer might in some instances be done in violation of the em-
ployer's express instructions.'" When the acts violate instructions, com-
18248 App. Div. 838, 290 N. Y. Supp. 168 (3d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y.
657, 5 N. E. 2d 379 (1936). See also, Murphy v. N. Y. Butchers Dressed Meat
Co., 249 App. Div. 888, 292 N. Y. Supp. 629 (3d Dep't 1937), where the employee
was crossing the street to buy a drink for the merchant from whom he had ob-
tained a check in payment of his employer's account. This was a custom and an
expense account was furnished for such courtesy. The court held that the em-
ployee was engaged in the interests of his employer and in the furtherance of the
employer's good will.
"'The instructions were to create good will for the customer of the employer
rather than for the employer himself, but the same reasoning and result would
seem.to follow in the latter situation.
78200 N. C. 654, 158 S. E. 188 (1931). See also, Bauman v. Howard J.
Ehmke Co., 126 Pa. Super. 108, 190 Atl. 343 (1937) where a salesman staying
overnight at a farmer's house helped the farmer fell a tree. Compensation was
awarded upon the ground that the assistance was no more than any other guest
would do in the natural order of events. In Boyd v. Philmont Country Club, 129
Pa. Super. 135, 195 Atl. 156 (1937), a caddy went into the woods to pick flowers
upon the request of a customer of the defendant and was struck by a golf ball.
Compensation was granted.
" No workmen's compensation cases discussing good will as a basis for award-
ing or denying compensation when the acts violated instructions have been found.
In Cole v. Johnson Motor Co., 217 N. C. 756, 9 S. E. 2d 425 (1940) (liability of
the master for tort of servant) the court said, conceding the instructions pro-
hibited picking up riders, it would be questionable whether the violation was such
a deviation from the employment as would put the employee entirely without the
purposes and confines of his employment and relieve the employer from liability.
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pensation is generally denied if the instructions limited the sphere of the
employment, but compensation is generally awarded if the instructions
merely directed the employees not to do certain acts, or not to do an
act within the sphere of the employment in a certain way.20 If the
violation does not take the employee out of the sphere of the employ-
ment, he is only guilty of negligence and is not deprived of the pro-
tection of the workmen's compensation acts.21  In addition, where the
act is necessitated by an emergency,22 or the instructions against com-
mitting the acts is habitually violated,23 the employee's case is greatly
strengthened.
It is submitted that if there is authority, express or implied, to do
acts in furtherance of the employer's good will, such acts should not
be held to be a deviation from the course of the employment to the
extent that compensation will not be granted. Of course, the courts
will have to examine the facts and circumstances of each case and
apply a reasonable rule, such as, whether the acts could be reasonably
held within the scope of an employer's policy to create good will. The
courts might go further and base the award on whether the act did
create, or was aimed at creating, good will for the employer; but what-
ever the theory or basis used, good will should be given careful con-
sideration by the courts when applicable to a particular fact situation.
CALVIN B. BRYANT.
Criminal Law-Attempted Perjury-the Rules of "Legal" and
"Factual" Impossibility as Applied to the Law of
Criminal Attempts
In a recent decision, State v. Latiolais,l the Supreme Court of Loui-
siana upheld a conviction of attempted prejury. So far as is known, this
is the first reported conviction of such a crime in the history of law.2
" Maryland Casualty Co. v. Brown, 131 Tex. 404, 115 S. W. 2d 394 (1938);
Prentice v. Twin City Wholesale Grocery, 202 Minn. 455, 278 N. W. 895 (1938);
Moss v. Hamilton, 234 Ala. 181, 174 So. 622 (1937).21 See note 20 supra.
"2 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U. S. 504 (1951). Defendant main-
tained a recreation area for employees. It was forbidden, and signs were erected
to that effect, to swim in the channel because of the dangerous currents. The
plaintiff's intestate swam in the channel in an attempt to rescue an unknown man
and was downed. Compensation was granted.
"2 Archie v. Greene Bros. Lumber Co., 222 N. C. 477, 23 S. E. 2d 834 (1934):
Moss v. Hamilton, 234 Ala. 181, 174 So. 622 (1937).
1225 La. 878, 74 So. 2d 148 (1954).
2 Generally, when courts have been unable to convict a defendant of perjury, the
defendant has been acquitted. Where, for example, the officer administering the
oath did not have authority to administer it, courts have held that a demurrer to
the indictment should be sustained. United States v. Curtis, i07 U. S. 671 (1883) ;
United States v. Garcelon, 82 Fed. 611 (D. Colo. 1897) ; United States v. Edwards,
43 Fed. 67 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1890) ; State v. Phippen, 62 Iowa 54, 17 N. W. 146
(1883).
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